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Göttingen  MAGKS Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty
by Matthias Göcke
(University of Giessen)
Abstract: Efficiency wage effects of profit sharing are combined with option values related to
stochastic future profit variations. These option effects occur if the workers’ profit share is
fixed  by  long-term  contracts.  The  Pareto-improving  optimal  level  of  the  sharing  ratio  is
calculated for two different scenarios. First, if the firm can unilaterally decide, the expected
present value of net profits is maximised. Second, if the sharing ratio is based on bilateral
Nash  bargaining.  Since  a  larger  variation  of  revenues  implies  a  higher  redistribution  of
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Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty
1. Introduction
Since high wages can be a device to increase motivation and productivity of workers, some
firms find it profitable to offer an extra pay in excess of the workers’ reservation wage in
order to elicit more effort. These “efficiency wages” may arise due to unobservable individual
effort (in the so-called ‘shirking version’): the firm (principal) – unable to monitor individual
effort – can try to increase productivity of the employees (agents) through incentives based on
the remuneration scheme. (For an overview see LEVINE [1989]). If this extra pay is not a fixed
payment but based on sharing the firm’s profits with the employees, these incentive effects are
even amplified, since now the productivity benefits of cooperation partly flow to the workers,
and because the marginal benefits of shirking are reduced. Thus, efficiency wages based on
profit sharing (PS) may be an adequate instrument (see LIN, CHANG & LAI [ 2002] for an
overview of the synthesis of profit sharing and efficiency wages). The positive productivity
effects of giving a share of the profit as an extra payment to the workers are corroborated
empirically (WADHWANI & WALL [1990], KRUSE [1992], SESSIONS [2008]). Extra Payments
based on PS in addition to a fixed base wage can be used autonomously as an incentive
instrument by a firm or can be the result of a bilateral bargaining process of the firm with a
worker or with the union (for aspects of efficiency wages and bargaining see POHJOLA [1987]
and SANFEY [1993]). Frequently, profit sharing schemes are fixed not only for the present
period, but are based on a long-run commitment of the firm. However, the firm has to keep in
mind  that  future  profits  are  stochastically  uncertain  (KOSKELA  &  STENBACKA  [2004]).
Moreover, profit sharing is usually limited to positive profits, while negative profits will lead
to a market exit of the firm and consequently to firing of the workforce. Thus, a commitment
to a long-term PS scheme actually implies that a firm gives an option to the worker: If the
future turns out to be advantageous, high profits will be shared with the worker, however, in
an  unfavourable  future  shared  profits  are  downwards  limited  to  zero.  Since  the  negative
realisations  of  the  stochastic  process  of  future  profits  are  truncated,  the  money  which  is
expected to be given to the workers as a share of the profits is the more, the larger is the
expected revenue variation. Anticipation of this option effect by the firm leads to a more
reluctant attitude towards PS by the firm, the more variable the revenues are. In this paper a
simple model is presented describing these option/variation effects on voluntary “long-term”
PS schemes based on unilateral firm decisions as well as on bilateral Nash bargaining.
The  structure  of  the  paper  is  as  follows:  In  section  2.  a  simple  formulation  of  positive
productivity effects due to sharing profits is presented. In section 3. this productivity effect is
integrated into a short-run scenario, where the relation between present revenues and Pareto
improvement due to profit sharing is analysed. The consequences of uncertain future revenues
in long-run PS schemes are addressed in section 4. Section 5. concludes.
2. A simple model of productivity effects due to profit sharing
A  price-taking  firm  produces  a  final  product  using  one  unit  of  labour  input  (i.e.  one
employee). This worker has the opportunity to receive a standard market wage w if (s)he
works under the conditions of the standard wage agreement without profit sharing, either in
our firm or in another firm. This outside opportunity of the worker serves as the base wage wM. Göcke: Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 2
in our analysis and is, as a numéraire, normalised to unity: w = 1. The firm has the opportunity
to give the employee a share of its profit as an extra compensation in addition to the standard
wage w in order to encourage the employee to work harder. The larger the worker’s ratio λ of
the profit, the higher is the incentive to work hard, and thus, the higher is the productivity of
labour. As the reciprocal of productivity, the input coefficient is a decreasing function of the
worker’s sharing ratio λ.
(1) α = α(λ,·)     with   
∂α
∂λ ≤ 0 λ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ [0,  1]
Since the standard wage w is normalised to unity, the input coefficient α equals the unit ‘base
labour costs’ (excluding the worker’s profit share). In order to keep the mathematics as simple
as possible and to be able to calculate closed form solutions the following simple functional
form of the labour input coefficient resp. the unit labour costs α is assumed:
(2) α = α(λ,η) = 
1
1 + η ⋅ λ      η ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ [0,  1[
with: α : input coefficient of labour = unit labour costs
λ : worker’s sharing ratio of the profit (= share parameter)
η : efficiency parameter of PS
The more effective profit sharing is – i.e. the more severe the monitoring problems without
extra monetary incentives are –, the larger is the efficiency parameter η in eq. (2), i.e. the
lower are the unit labour costs in a situation with profit sharing. Due to the normalisation of
the base wage (w = 1) these ‘base’ unit labour costs are normalised to one for a situation
without profit sharing [i.e.  α(λ=0) = 1 ].
Selling the final product in the current period t, the firm receives the price pt. The profit per
unit of the product is (pt – α). A single worker is able to produce more than one unit of the
product if the productivity increases, i.e. if the input coefficient decreases: The production
quantity of a single worker is  xt = (1 / α) and the profit per employee is  xt ⋅ (pt – α) and –
corrected by the ‘dilution effect’ due to the employee’s profit sharing ratio λ – in period t the
firm’s current net profit Rt is:
(3) Rt = (1 – λ) ⋅ 
pt – α
α   =  (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pt – 1 ]
In absence of any firing and hiring costs the firm will be active on the product market (and
employ a worker), if the profit Rt is positive and leave the market if the profit is negative. The
price level which triggers the market exit can be calculated via zero profit:
(4) Rt = 0     ⇔     pt = α =  
1
1 + η ⋅ λ
with:  market exit and firing the worker  if  pt < α
The firm reacts with an firing strategy if the price level falls short of the unit labour costs α.M. Göcke: Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 3
3. Determination of the worker’s profit share in a “short-term” situation
We start with a situation, where the firm decides about PS as an incentive device only in the
current period t. Thus, we have a short-term situation, where all relevant factors (e.g. the
product price level pt) are known. I.e. in the short run we have a situation with certainty.
3.1 Profit sharing as a Pareto improvement
Sharing the firm’s profits brings about an incentive effect and increases the productivity of
labour. Thus, paying an extra compensation exceeding the standard wage may be profitable
for both – the worker and the firm. We assume that the worker may get a share of the profits
as  an  efficiency  wage  premium  in  addition  to  the  standard/market  wage  w,  as  an  extra
compensation for working harder. Since both, the firm and the worker, have to opt for PS
voluntarily, contracts including shared profits as an efficiency premium will only result if both
contracting parties are better off, i.e. if PS results in a Pareto-superior situation compared to a
standard market wage compensation.
The  firm  will  prefer  profit  sharing  (λ > 0)  to  a  situation  with  merely  a  standard  wage
compensation (λ = 0) if – after correcting for the ‘profit dilution’ due to the worker’s share –
an  additional  ‘net’  profit  results  for  the  firm.  This  extra  net  profit  Zt  due  to  the
incentive/productivity effect of sharing profits compared to an alternative without PS is to be
differentiated concerning two different cases: case [a], where price level pt is high, so that
producing  the product  is profitable  anyway,  with  or  without  PS.  In  this  case  [a]  the  two
relevant opportunities of the firm are: being active on the market with PS compared to be
active without PS. In case [b], the price level is low so that only the cost reducing efficiency
effects  of  PS  are  ensuring  profitability.  In  case  [b]  the  alternatives  are:  activity  with  PS
compared to not being active at all (with zero profit). Since  Rt(λ=0) = pt – 1 , the borderline
price between both cases is  pt = 1.
(5) Zt = Rt(λ>0) – Rt(λ=0)  =  (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pt – 1 ]  –  D(pt) ⋅ [ pt – 1 ]
with a binary variable:   D(pt > 1) = 1     ⇔  case [a]
D(pt ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ 1) = 0     ⇔  case [b]
The firm prefers PS to a standard wage compensation, if the extra profit Zt of PS is positive. If
the price level is very high, the ‘dilution effect’ of sharing profits (which is negative from the
firm’s point of view) is larger than the labour cost reduction via the ‘incentive effect’. Thus, a
price ceiling exists, at which PS becomes unattractive for a very profitable firm. Hence, in
case [a] (pt > 1) and for a high price level, PS is only beneficial for the firm if Zt > 0.
(6) Zt > 0  ⇒  firm prefers PS if  pt < pf  ,  with   pf = 
1
1 – η ⋅ (1 – λ) ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ 1
A worker will agree to a compensation including shared profits if the entire compensation
exceeds the standard wage (w = 1) and if, additionally, a reimbursement for the disutility of
working  harder  due  to  PS  is  paid.  Since  a  higher  λ  is  related  to  a  lower  labour  input
coefficient α, the disutility of working harder is positively related to the profit share λ. A
disutility parameter (θ ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ 1) is multiplied by productivity/effort parameters (η ⋅ λ) in order to
capture the disutility effect [θ ⋅ (η ⋅ λ)]. The worker’s premium Lt resulting from PS – correctedM. Göcke: Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 4
by the disutility effect – has to be positive in order to make PS preferable for the worker.
Thus, the worker’s implicit lowest-price limit pw at which (s)he will accept a PS contract
instead of a standard wage contract is:
(7) Lt = 
λ
1 – λ
 ⋅ Rt – θ ⋅ (η ⋅ λ)  =  λ ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pt – 1 ] – θ ⋅ η ⋅ λ   > 0     with  θ ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ 0
Lt > 0  ⇒  worker prefers PS if  pt > pw  , with   pw = 
1 + η ⋅ θ
1 + η ⋅ λ = α ⋅ (1 + η ⋅ θ)
The unit labour costs α multiplied by an ‘effort cost’ factor (1 + η ⋅ θ) determine the worker’s
price floor for favourable profit sharing.
To sum up, in the case of effective incentives (η > 0), both the firm and the worker may be
better off by profit sharing. An extra efficiency compensation exceeding the standard wage w
is Pareto-superior if:
(8) pw  <  pt  <  pf     ⇔     
1 + η ⋅ θ
1 + η ⋅ λ  <  pt  <  
1
1 – η ⋅ (1 – λ)
A sufficient condition for the existence of a real range  pw < pf  with Pareto-superiority of PS
is: ( η > 0  ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧  θ < 1 ).
3.2 Firm alone decides about profit sharing
Since  shared  profits  are  given  voluntarily  by  the  firm  as  an  efficiency  wage  premium  in
addition to the worker’s opportunity wage w, we now assume that the firm has unilaterally the
right to determine the level of the ratio λ of its profits which is given as a bonus to the worker.
Correspondingly, the worker has the right to accept the PS efficiency wage contract based on
the  share  level  λ  offered  by  our  firm,  or  to  turn  down  the  offer  and  to  opt  for  a
standard/market wage contract.
If the firm wants to utilise the efficiency effect of PS it can decide upon the magnitude of the
share λ of the profits which is given to the worker. The level of the worker’s sharing ratio λ is
chosen by the firm so as to maximise the value of the firm’s net profit. This profit-maximising
ratio λ
c
f can be calculated via the first order condition:
(9) FOC:   
∂Zt
∂λ = 0     ⇒     λ
c
f =  
1 – pt + η ⋅ pt
2 ⋅ η ⋅ pt




2 ⋅ η + 
1
2 ⋅ η ⋅ pt
⇔   pt = 
1
1 – η +2 ⋅ η ⋅ λ
c
f
restrictions:   pt∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ [α,  pf]  ⇔  λ
c
f ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ [0,  1]
The profit maximising ratio λ
c
f is decreasing in the product price pt; and for pt = 1 this ratio is
½. If the price level approaches the firm’s “Pareto price ceiling” pf, the profit-maximising λ
c
f
approaches 0, and for prices above pf sharing very high profits is not attractive for the firm
due to the very expensive dilution effect. If the price equals the unit costs α, the profit is 0,
and thus the (from the firm’s point of view) optimal ratio λ
c
f is 1. However, the range of PS is
limited by the acceptance of the worker. Substituting pt by the workers “Pareto floor price” pw
in the FOC in equation (9) and solving for λ results in:M. Göcke: Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 5
(10) pt ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ pw   ⇔   λ
c
f ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ λ
c
max      with   λ
c
max =  
1 – θ + η ⋅ θ
1 + 2 ⋅ η ⋅ θ
Profit-maximising  PS  is  (relative  to  a  standard  wage  compensation)  an  advantage  for  the
worker if the price level exceeds pw, which implies that the corresponding profit-maximising
ratio is below λ
c
max. This ensures that the worker’s profit share is large enough to compensate
for her/his burden of working harder.
3.3 Negotiated profit sharing
Alternatively, the determination of the share parameter λ  may be  the  result  of  a bilateral
negotiation of the firm and the worker.  We  assume  a Nash bargaining  solution based  on
maximising the following Nash product Nt:
(11) Nt := Zt ⋅ Lt       with   max
λ
(Nt)     FOC:  
∂Nt
∂λ  = 0   ⇒   solution: λ
c
N
The solution of the FOC in case [a] (with pt > 1) is:
(11 a) λ
c,[a]
N  = 
The solution for case [b] (pt ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ 1) was computed in closed form, however, the expression is to
extensive. For a simple situation without any disutility effect the solution for case [b] is:
(11 b) λ
c,[b]
N,(θ=0) =           for case [b]  and  θ = 0
(11 c) The borderline between both cases [a] and [b] is:  λ
a
b =   .
Fig. 1 shows the sharing ratio λ (on the abscissa) as a response to different price levels p = pt
(on the ordinate), for Nash bargaining (λ
c
N) and for net-profit maximisation (λ
c
f). Additionally,
the  Pareto-borders  are  depicted:  The  distance between  the  firm’s  price  ceiling  pf  and  the
worker’s price floor pw shows the range of Pareto-improvements by PS. This distance is the
larger, the larger the PS-efficiency parameter η and the smaller the disutility parameter θ of
working harder is. The Nash bargaining solution is “kinked” at p = 1, where the alternative
cases [a] and [b] are changing. For every price level p the resulting sharing ratio under Nash
bargaining λ
c
N exceeds the profit-maximising ratio λ
c
f. The higher the price level, the more
dominant becomes the ‘dilution effect’, and so the profit-maximising sharing ratio as well as
the Nash sharing ratio are decreasing in the price level.M. Göcke: Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 6
Fig. 1: Simulation for net-profit maximisation of the firm and for Nash bargaining
(η = 1/2 , θ = 1/4)
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4. Uncertainty and “long-term” profit sharing contracts
Instead of determining the share parameter only for the current period t, a “long-term” PS
contract fixes the ratio λ not only for the present period t but also for a second period t+1 (i.e.
the “future”) as well. However, since we allow for stochastic price variations, the future price
level  pt+1  and  the  future  profit  Rt+1  is  unknown  at  the  moment  when  the  PS  ratio  λ  is
permanently fixed by a contract.
4.1 A simple stochastic variation as an example
The  following  extension  of  the  model  is  designed  to  illustrate  the  impact  of  stochastic
variations of the future price level. However, in our simplistic model we merely analyse the
effects  of  an  expected  one-time  discrete  binomial  shock.  By  applying  this  very  simple
stochastic change, we are able to show how (and in which direction) the inclusion of option
effects qualitatively alter our results concerning (1) the Pareto-superior price range under PS
contracts, and (2) concerning the profit-maximising or the negotiated ratio λ of the profits a
worker will receive. Thus, our model can be seen as a simplistic example provided to show the
qualitative  effects  of  sharing  option  values.  These  effects  would  remain  in  a  more
realistic/sophisticated framework (with e.g. ongoing uncertainty, under application of a time-
continuous stochastic process). However, with our simple modelling, we are able to apply
simple algebraic methods instead of using dynamic programming techniques, and we are able
to calculate simple closed form analytical solutions.
We  assume  a  binomial  stochastic  process:  Both,  the  firm  and  the  worker,  expect  a  non-
recurring single stochastic change with an absolute size of ε ≥ 0, which can be either positive
(+ε) with probability W, or a negative (–ε) change, with probability (1 – W).M. Göcke: Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 7
(12) pt+1 = pt ± ε   ⇒   Et(pt+1) = W ⋅ (pt + ε) + (1 – W) ⋅ (pt – ε)  =  pt + (2 ⋅ W – 1) ⋅ ε
We assume that the planning horizon of the firm is two periods only: the current period t and
the “future” (t+1).
4.2 Options of an active firm
The expected present value of the firm is the probability-weighted average of the present
values  of  both  stochastic  ε-realisations.  Concerning  the  present  price  level  three  possible
situations are relevant.
Situation 1: ( α + ε < pt ). If in period t the price level exceeds (α + ε), the firm will earn a
positive profit in both periods, even in the case of a negative (–ε)-realisation. Thus, the firm
will continue its activity in period t+1 in any case.
Situation 2: ( α < pt < α + ε ). The firm is active in period t, Conditional on a positive (+ε)-
change, which has the probability W, the firm will stay active in period t+1. Conditional on a
negative (–ε)-realisation, which has the probability (1 – W), the firm will use its option to
leave the market in t+1, since then the price level is below the unit labour costs α.
Situation 3: ( α – ε < pt < α ). In the current period the price level pt is below the cost level α.
However, the firm will enter the market in t+1 if a positive (+ε)-change will occur, and will
(with probability W) earn positive future profits.
In order to be able to use a single general notation for all three situations, a formulation using
an average price is applied. In situation 2 (α < pt < α + ε), the firm is active in period t with
probability 1 and in period t+1 with probability W. We calculate a weighted average price
level over both periods, conditional on market activity. The weights are 1 for the present and
the  probability  W  multiplied  by  a  discount/weighting  factor  δ  for  future  variables.  This
probability weighted average price level pa2 is:
(13) situation 2 ( α < pt < α + ε ):    pa2 = 
1
1 + δ⋅W
 ⋅ [1 ⋅ pt + δ⋅W ⋅ (pt + ε) ]  =  pt + 
δ⋅W ⋅ ε
1 + δ⋅W
In situation 1 (pt > α + ε), the firm is active in both periods t and t+1 with probability 1. The
probability weighted average price level pa1 is:




 ⋅ [ pt + δ ⋅ W ⋅ (pt + ε) + δ ⋅ (1 – W) ⋅ (pt – ε)]  =  pt + 
δ ⋅ (2⋅W – 1) ⋅ ε
1 + δ
In situation 3 (α – ε < pt < α) the firm is inactive in period t, and with probability W active in
t+1. Conditional on market activity, the probability weighted average price level pa3 is:
(15) situation 3  (α – ε < pt < α):   pa3 = 
1
W
 ⋅ [ W ⋅ (pt + ε) ]  =  pt + ε
The expected present value V1 of the firm in situation 1 is the current profit Rt plus the
discounted expected profit in the next period Et(Rt+1):M. Göcke: Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 8
(16) situation 1  (pt > α + ε):
Et(Rt+1) = (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ Et(pt+1) – 1 ]
              = Rt + (1 – λ) ⋅ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ (2 ⋅ W – 1) ⋅ ε
⇒   V1 = Rt + δ ⋅ Et(R1,t+1)
            = (1 + δ) ⋅ Rt + δ ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ (2 ⋅ W – 1) ⋅ ε
⇔   V1 = (1 + δ) ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pa1 – 1 ]
Expected present value V2 of the firm in situation 2 is the current profit Rt plus a positive
future profit in case of a (+ε)-realisation, with probability W:
(17) situation 2  (α < pt < α + ε):
Et(Rt+1) = W ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ (pt + ε) – 1 ]
⇒   V2 = Rt + δ ⋅ Et(Rt+1)
            = (1 + δ ⋅ W) ⋅ Rt + δ ⋅ W ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ ε
⇔   V2 = (1 + δ ⋅ W) ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pa2 – 1 ]
Expected present value V3 of the firm in situation 3 is a zero current profit plus a positive
future profit in case of a (+ε)-change:
(18) situation 3  (α – ε < pt < α):
       V3 = δ ⋅ Et(Rt+1)  =   δ ⋅ W ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ (pt + ε) – 1 ]
⇔   V3 = δ ⋅ W ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pa3 – 1 ]
A general formulation representing all situations (i = 1,  2,  3) of the expected present value is:
(19) Vi = Ci ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pai – 1 ]
with a constant   Ci (i = 1,  2,  3):  C1 = (1 + δ) ,  C2 = (1 + δ ⋅ W) ,  C3 = δ ⋅ W
4.3 “Long-term” PS contracts and Pareto improvement
A risk-neutral firm will prefer profit sharing (λ > 0) to a situation with merely a standard wage
compensation (λ = 0) if – after correcting for the employee’s profit share – an additional “net”
expected  present  value  Zi  results  for  the  firm.  In  the  alternative  without  PS  (λ = 0)  the
expected present value Vi is positive for pai > 1 . Thus, the net gain Zi from PS is:
(20) Zi = Vi(λ>0) – Vi(λ=0)  =  Ci ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pai – 1 ]  –  D(pai) ⋅ [ pai – 1 ]
with a binary dummy:   D(pai > 1) = 1     ⇔  case [a]
D(pai ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ 1) = 0     ⇔  case [b]M. Göcke: Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 9
The firm prefers PS if the extra present value Zi of PS is positive:
(21) Zi > 0   if   pai < 
1
1 – η ⋅ (1 – λ)     ⇒    firm prefers PS if  pai < pf
The workers are risk-neutral as well and have the same expectations as the firm. A worker
agrees to PS if the expected compensation exceeds the standard wage compensation plus a
reimbursement  for  the  disutility  of  working  harder.  The  worker’s  expected  premium  Li
resulting from PS has to be positive. Thus, the worker’s implicit lowest-price limit at which
(s)he will accept a PS contract instead of a standard wage contract is:
(22) Li = Ci ⋅ { λ ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pai – 1 ] – θ ⋅ η ⋅ λ }  > 0
⇒   worker prefers PS if   pai >  pw = 
1 + η ⋅ θ
1 + η ⋅ λ =  α ⋅ (1 + η ⋅ θ)
Analogous to the short-term case under certainty (from section 3.), both the firm and the
worker can be better off by PS. A “long-term” contract with a time invariant fixed profit share
λ is Pareto-superior if:
(23) pw  <  pai  <  pf    ⇔     
1 + η ⋅ θ
1 + η ⋅ λ  <  pai  <  
1
1 – η ⋅ (1 – λ)
If the firm unilaterally can decide upon the magnitude of the time-invariant ratio λ of the
profits which is given to the worker, λ is chosen by the firm so as to maximise the expected
present value Zi:
(24) FOC:   
∂Zi
∂λ = 0     ⇒     λ
u
f =  
1 – pai + η ⋅ pai
2 ⋅ η ⋅ pai




2 ⋅ η + 
1
2 ⋅ η ⋅ pai
⇔   pai = 
1
1 – η + 2 ⋅ η ⋅ λ
u
f
This is similar to the solution of the short-term case in eq. (9), if the present period price pt is
replced by the weighted average price pai.
Alternatively,  the  determination  of  the  sharing  ratio  λ  may  be  the  result  of  a  bilateral
negotiation  of  the  firm  with  the  worker.  We  again  assume  a  Nash  bargaining  based  on
maximising the following “long-term” Nash product Ni:
(25) Ni := Zi ⋅ Li       with   max
λ
(Ni)     FOC:  
∂Ni
∂λ  = 0   ⇒   solution: λ
u
N
Again, the long-term solution λ
u
N is analogous to the short-term solution in eq. (11), if the
current  price  p = pt  is  replaced  by  the  weighted  average  price  pai.  The  short-term  case  –
without  any  uncertainty  about  the  current  price  –  can  be  interpreted  as  a  special  case  of
situation i = 1, with a zero uncertainty level: ε = 0. Thus, the general solution for all cases is
given  by  eqs.  (19)  to  (25).  A  graphical  representation  of  all  situations  (i = 1, 2, 3)  wouldM. Göcke: Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 10
resemble Fig. 1, if instead of the current price p = pt the average price level pai is stated on the
ordinate. A representation of all situations in one diagram based on the current price level pt
would shift all graphs vertically downwards by an extent of si, depending on the situation:
(26) pt = pai – si    with:  s1 = 
δ ⋅ (2⋅W – 1) ⋅ ε
1 + δ   ,  s2 = 
δ⋅W ⋅ ε
1 + δ⋅W  ,  s3 = ε
A numerical simulation of the Nash bargaining solution is shown in Fig. 2 by a (p,λ)-diagram
and the corresponding profit-maximising solution is illustrated in Fig. 3. The reaction of the
share parameter λ on the current price level is discontinuous at the borderline between the
three relevant situations: the unit costs-curve α, separating situation 2 and 3, and at the curve
for (α + ε), separating situation 1 and 2. As it is obvious in both figures, the vertical shift of the




f is equivalent to a shift of all these
graphs to the left, eventually resulting in lower sharing ratios. In situation 1, with a high price
level, the firm will continue to employ the worker in the future even in case of a negative (–ε)-
change. Though the level of future profits is uncertain, however, in situation 1 continuing the
activity is certain. In situation 2, where the price is below (α + ε), the firm will exit the market
and fire the worker in case of a negative (–ε)-realisation, however, for a positive (+ε)-change
the profits will be shared. In this situation 2 the firm does not only share current profits, but
with the long-term PS contract the firm additionally gives the worker an option to share high
future profits in case of (+ε) – and simultaneously ensures not to share low profits (or even
losses) if in the future a negative (–ε)-realisation will occur. Since the negative realisation
with  low  profits  is  truncated,  and  since  only  very  profitable  realisations  are  resulting  in
effective production and actual profit sharing, in situation 2 the firm is more reluctant to fix a
high sharing ratio λ in a long-term PS contract. This option effect dominates in situation 3,
where the firm is currently not employing the worker, but with a chance of future employment
if a (+ε)-realisation will eventuate. In situation 3, via permanently fixing λ in advance by a
long-term PS scheme, the firm has no advantage for the current period, but only gives the
worker an option to participate in future profits, conditional on the case that these profits are
high. Consequently, under uncertainty the firm is very reluctant to fix high sharing ratios for
future employees. In situations 2 and 3, where these options on future profits are relevant, the
shift downwards (resp. to the left) is the stronger the larger the absolute level of uncertainty ε
is. Furthermore, in situations 1 and 2, the firm prefers a low sharing ratio, if a positive future
is very probable, i.e. if the probability W of a (+ε)-change is large. Moreover, with a larger ε,
situations 2 and 3 are prevailing, since the distance between the borderlines α and (α + ε)
increases. On the contrary, situation 1 prevails if the level of uncertainty ε is relatively low. A
comparison to a situation with a lower level of uncertainty ε is illustrated in Fig. 4.M. Göcke: Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 11
Fig. 2: Illustration of “long-term” Nash bargaining λ
u
N under uncertainty
(η = 1/2 , θ = 1/4 , W = 1/2 , ε = 1/2, δ = 9/10)
λ














Fig. 3: Illustration of “long-term” net-profit maximisation λ
u
f under uncertainty
(η = 1/2 , θ = 1/4 , W = 1/2 , ε = 1/2,)
λ
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Fig. 4: “Long-term” Nash bargaining λ
u
N and profit maximisation λ
u
f
with a low level of uncertainty (ε = 1/4)
























In this contribution a very simple model of profit sharing as an entrepreneurial instrument to
create  incentive-based  productivity  effects  was  presented.  If  efficiency  gains  result,  a
remuneration contract including shared profits as a premium pay in addition to the market
wage is Pareto-superior: By sharing the efficiency gains, both parties, the firm and the worker,
are better off compared to a standard wage regime. Furthermore, the efficiency gains due to
sharing profits may result in stimulation of labour demand and employment, since the firm’s
costs are reduced – though the worker receives a higher overall compensation. However, the
focus of this paper is to combine efficiency effects of profit sharing with the impact of an
option value which is based on the expected variation of stochastic future profits, if a long-
term  profit  sharing  scheme  is  ex-ante  determined.  An  optimal  remuneration  policy  was
presented for two scenarios: First, the firm unilaterally offers a premium based on sharing
profits  in  order  to  maximise  the  firm’s  profits,  and  second,  a  bilateral  Nash  bargaining
solution was computed. In both cases option value effects have to be considered by the firm
when permanently determining an optimal instrumental level of the profit sharing ratio given
to the worker. The inclusion of expected future revenue variations results in a lower worker’s
profit sharing ratio – since a larger variation of revenue implies a higher redistribution of
profits from firm to worker if a positive revenue change will occur in the future. In the case of
a favourable future revenue development very high profits must be shared with the workers. In
contrast, negative future outcomes are truncated, since future losses will not be shared because
the firm uses its option to fire a worker in a loss situation, and since the worker has the option
to leave the firm and to work elsewhere for the standard market wage. This is anticipated by
the firm and results in a lower worker’s sharing ratio which the firm is willing to fix in a long-
term wage contract if the sharing ratio is ex-ante determined and held constantly over a period
of time.M. Göcke: Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 13
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